Safety-critical industries traditionally operate on the assumption that procedural compliance
ensures safe performance and that unsafe outcomes emerge primarily when individuals deviate from approved instructions, standards, or regulatory boundaries. This logic—compliance
equals safety; deviation equals risk—underpins investigation frameworks, accountability
structures, enforcement models, and training philosophies in domains such as aviation,
healthcare, nuclear energy, rail, maritime operations, and chemical process industries.
However, field investigations and observational studies increasingly demonstrate that real-
world work rarely matches formal expectations. Variability in context, operational conditions,
system states, timing, resource availability, and environmental constraints means that
procedures describe how work is imagined, not how it is performed. Operators routinely adapt,
modify, or bypass procedural steps to maintain operational continuity and preserve safety. In a
recently published thesis, Ankersø and Nielsen refer to this form of deliberate, safety-oriented
deviation as Selective Intentional Non-Compliance (SINC): purposeful departures from
procedure undertaken to maintain functional performance under conditions where strict
execution is insufficient or unsafe.
This paper examines the tension between compliance-based safety models and the role of
adaptive performance in preventing hazardous outcomes. Using the conceptual framework
illustrated in Figure 1, we propose the identification of a previously unacknowledged region: the
SINC-Avoid zone, the operational space where strict procedural compliance can contribute to
hazard escalation while adaptive deviation preserves system safety. Recognising, training for,
and governing this capability is essential if safety management systems are to remain effective
within complex, variable, and dynamic environments.
Keywords: compliance; non-compliance; resilience engineering; Work-as-Imagined; Work-as-
Done; just culture; SINC; SINC-Avoid.